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The aim of this paper is to discuss the possible impact of the “third wave” of technological 
unemployment on economic theorizing. Twenty-first century technological progress, 
heavily impacting on employment, is a process that just started but whose main new 
feature is already well known. This feature concerns robots (and artificial intelligence) 
and their entry into the production process. Robots do not simply increase labor 
productivity in cooperation with humans but can substitute for human labor, producing 
commodities without human input possible and hence, possibly, giving rise to long-term 
mass unemployment which will require some form of public policy intervention. This 
scenario exhibits important implications for economic theorizing, since mainstream 
theory, rooted in the general equilibrium approach, faces difficulties in dealing with a 
reality where social classes and the class struggle (a few robot owners vs. many 
unemployed humans) regain a role, labor productivity becomes irrelevant and 
uncorrelated with the (subsistence) wage/subsidy that must be paid to the unemployed, 
the labor market does not clear, redistributive policies replace the optimal allocation of 
scarce means, and so on. This scenario returns economic theorization to the years of 
classical Political Economy, when the main focus of theoretical investigation was on 
social classes, the class struggle and redistribution of the surplus. In particular, Sraffa’s 
1960 model might represent a good foundation for further theoretical development. 
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Introduction 
The debate on the possibility that technological progress causes long-term 
unemployment regained importance in recent years, with the advent of the Fourth Industrial 
Revolution. The first three industrial revolutions (1765–1830, 1870–1914, and 1969–today) 
initiated two different waves of short-term technological unemployment, but their effects were 
reabsorbed in the longer term by the operation of effective compensating forces. In contrast, 
according to a number of recent contributions, (e.g., Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2011, 2014; 
Freeman 2015; Ford 2015; D’Orlando 2018; for some aspects Acemoglu and Restrepo 2017, 
2019), the Fourth Industrial Revolution, which started to affect the economy at the beginning 
of the 21st century, will be radically different from the others and will give rise to a third wave 
of technological unemployment that traditional compensating forces might be unable to 
reabsorb. 
 
Conflicting views were always present in the theoretical literature on the theme of 
technological unemployment, but the debate that developed during the first three industrial 
revolutions somehow reached the majority conclusion that technological progress cannot 
generate long-term unemployment because of the effectiveness of the compensating forces. 
These forces were mainly founded on wage reductions and (demand and) production increases 
that reabsorbed unemployment. Furthermore, the theoretical analysis was confirmed by 
empirical evidence of employment increases during periods of strong technical progress, even 
though supporters of the hypothesis of technological unemployment imputed such a result 
mainly to the simultaneous reduction of per capita working hours.  
 
Nowadays, the scenario changed, because, unlike in the first three industrial revolutions, 
machines no longer merely cooperate with human workers but now substitute for them in the 
production process. Although not yet the case, in the next few years, the possibility exists that 
robots endowed with artificial intelligence will be capable of substituting for both skilled and 
unskilled workers in almost all industries, as well as for workers performing routine and non-
routine tasks, so that realizing production without human input will be possible. Moreover, if 
robots are more productive and less expensive than human workers, their substitution for 
humans will be both feasible and economically convenient. The likely result is long-term mass 
unemployment.  
 
The above described scenario bears important implications for both the theoretical 
analysis and the effectiveness of compensating forces. On the first point, i.e., the theoretical 
analysis, it is immediately evident that the introduction of robots into productive processes 
implies that all the conclusions reached by previous theoretical studies are irrelevant for the 
present case. Models built to study a world in which machines cooperate with humans but 
cannot substitute for them, except in very few tasks, are irrelevant in a world in which they can 
substitute for humans in all tasks at a lower cost, without cooperating with them. The same 
holds for the empirical conclusions reached for the past waves of technological unemployment, 
since we are in the presence of a completely new phenomenon that has only just begun 
impacting on employment. 
 
Secondly, robots not simply might generate mass (technological) unemployment and 
condemn past theoretical studies to irrelevance, and they may also condemn the most 
important compensating forces to ineffectiveness. This is so because, to reabsorb this new type 
of technological unemployment, wage reductions would need to be huge, but wages exhibit a 
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subsistence minimum below which they cannot fall. Furthermore, the compensating force 
based on (demand and) production increase will be ineffective since this will result in an 
increase in employment mainly or uniquely for robots and not for humans if production can be 
realized by robots alone. Within such a framework, long-term mass unemployment becomes a 
realistic outcome that will require some form of public policy intervention.  
 
Public intervention may take a number of different forms, from redistributive policies 
(taxing robots, subsidizing unemployed humans, introducing mandatory quotas for human 
employment, paying an unconditional basic income to all citizens, etc.) to collectivizing the 
ownership of robots or firms. This paper briefly indicates all these policies, but mainly focuses 
on the capability of mainstream, (i.e., neoclassical) economic theory to deal adequately with the 
whole scenario. Traditional models studying the impact of technical progress, and even 
automation, on the economy, are all rooted in the neoclassical general equilibrium approach, 
are built on “ad hoc” hypotheses, disregard the possibility that the wage exhibits a subsistence 
lower bound and above all, rest on some kind of market clearing assumption, so that 
involuntary unemployment is, with few exceptions, out of question. The point here is that such 
models, and the neoclassical approach in general, face great difficulties in dealing with 
technological unemployment being rather incapable to systematize a reality in which social 
classes and the class struggle (a few robot owners vs. many unemployed humans) exhibit a 
crucial role, labor productivity becomes irrelevant and uncorrelated with the (subsistence) 
wage/subsidy that must be paid to the unemployed, redistributive policies gain relevance with 
respect to the optimal allocation of scarce means, and so on. Indeed, social classes, the class 
struggle, subsistence wages, and redistribution of the surplus were the objects of study of the 
“old” Political Economy, rooted in the works of the classical economists and Marx. To better 
understand and theoretically discuss what will happen in the near future, going back to the 
remote past might therefore be necessary, referring to the hints and the theoretical structure 
of Political Economy rather than of neoclassical theory. In particular, Sraffa’s 1960 model 
represents a good basic starting point for further, more refined, theoretical contributions on 
the theme. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 offers a brief description of the history of 
the first two waves of technological unemployment and of the building of a comprehensive 
theory called “compensation theory”, which studies automatic forces capable of bringing the 
economy back to full employment. Section 2 illustrates the main characteristics of the third 
wave of technological unemployment, which jeopardize the effectiveness of compensation 
theory and points out the possible policy intervention solutions for this problem. Section 3 
discusses the comparative capabilities of approaches rooted in neoclassical theory and in 
classical Political Economy, to theoretically systematize this new framework, showing that with 
respect to distributive questions, the latter appears to be more effective than the former, and 
hence Sraffa’s 1960 approach can be successfully used to discuss the problem. Section 4 
concludes the paper. 
The First Two Waves of Technological Unemployment and the “Theory of Compensation” 
 
The theoretical debate on technological unemployment was ignited by the First 
Industrial Revolution (roughly 1765–1830), when the invention of the steam engine 
represented a form of technological progress apparently capable of generating unemployment 
in a number of sectors. From then on, this debate played a marginal role during the Second 
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Industrial Revolution (roughly 1870–1914), when electric power was the basis of mass 
production, and during the Third Industrial Revolution (roughly 1969–today) when electronic 
and ITC technologies were used to automate production. The theme only regained relevance in 
the 21st century, when the advent of robots and artificial intelligence seemed capable of opening 
the way to what Schwab (2016) called the “Fourth Industrial Revolution”.i  
 
The first three industrial revolutions generated two different waves of technological 
unemployment. During the First and Second Industrial Revolutions, individuals saw a first 
wave of technological unemployment, as a result of technical progress that mainly relocated 
workers from one sector (firstly from agriculture and later from manufacturing) to another 
(firstly to manufacturing and later to services). During the Third Industrial Revolution, things 
changed a little, and researchers can find two main interpretations of the impact of 
technological progress. According to some scholars, skill-biased technical changeii mainly 
reduced employment for unskilled workers, as well reducing their wages and increasing the 
wages of skilled workers, the skill premium, and inequality.iii According to other scholars, task-
biased technical changeiv mainly affected workers performing routine tasks, so that this 
approach has also been named routine-replacing technical change (RRTC). However, all the 
above interpretations conclude that, in the general case, the impact of technological progress 
on unemployment was significant in the short term but small in the long term (Campa 2017, p. 
5). 
The mechanism that resulted in technological progress impacting on employment was 
the same for all the first three industrial revolutions and is quite simple. Within a neoclassical 
framework, the choice between hiring labor (workers) or capital (machines) represents the 
standard choice-of-technique problem: given the produced quantities, entrepreneurs will 
substitute capital for labor if the value of the marginal product of capital divided by the money 
price of the service of capital is greater than the value of the marginal product of labor divided 
by the money wage rate. Hence, machines destroy human jobs if the following occurs: (i) capital 
productivity increases and/or the price of the service of capital decreases or (ii) labor 
productivity decreases and/or the wage rate increases. It is worth noting that technological 
progress in the form of product innovation is generally considered to be employment friendly, 
whereas process innovation can, in some cases, increase capital productivity more than labor 
productivity and can reduce the price of the service of capital, leading to the possibility that 
unemployment rises with technical progress if process innovation is strong. Nonetheless, 
according to the consensus view, unemployment should be reabsorbed, due to the 
simultaneous operation of a number of converging mechanisms, which were described by many 
authors and which constitute the theoretical approach referred to by Marx as compensation 
theory (Vivarelli 2007, p. 2).v Various scholars described some of these mechanisms (see, e.g., 
Vivarelli 2007, 2014; Blien and Ludewig 2017; Campa 2017; Peters 2017; Calvino and Virgillito 
2018), but their lists were never, and probably cannot be, exhaustive.  
 
The compensating forces can be divided into automatic mechanisms and deliberate 
intervention mechanisms. Automatic mechanisms are mainly rooted in the neoclassical 
approach, whereas deliberate intervention mechanisms are mainly rooted in the Keynesian 
approach.vi 
 
Among the automatic mechanisms, the following are the most important: (i) Wage 
flexibility, which allows wages to reduce in the presence of unemployment, thus increasing 
firms’ labor demand and allowing full employment to be regained. (ii) Employment increases 
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in the sector that produces the machines, due to an increase in demand for, and production of, 
machines. (iii) Fall in production costs, and hence in prices of commodities produced by the 
machines, leading to an increase in the demand for these commodities, an increase in 
production, and hence an increase in employment.vii (iv) Fall in production costs, and hence in 
prices of commodities produced by the machines, leading to an increase in real income and 
hence demand for goods, an increase in production, and finally an increase in employment. (v) 
Fall in production costs which, in the presence of price rigidities, increases profits and hence 
investment, in turn increasing production and employment in the sector that produces 
investment goods. (vi) Fall in production costs which, in the presence of price rigidities, 
increases profits, leading to higher demand from entrepreneurs for goods and hence increases 
in production and employment in the sector that produces consumption goods. (vii) Product 
innovation which creates new sectors of activity and employment in these sectors. (viii) 
Increase in the wages of the employed, increase in their demand for commodities, and increase 
in production and employment in these sectors. (ix) Transition of employed humans from the 
primary to the secondary sector when jobs are destroyed in the primary sector, and then from 
the secondary to the tertiary sector, when jobs are destroyed in the secondary sector. (x) 
Increase in the marginal productivity of labor caused by an increase in capital accumulation, 
and hence modification of the choice of techniques in favor of labor. (xi) Fall in machines’ 
marginal productivity caused by their increased use, due to capital accumulation, and hence 
modification of the choice of techniques in favor of labor. (xii) Fall in production costs and hence 
in prices of commodities, leading to an increase in the real supply of money, a reduction in the 
interest rate and hence an increase in investment and employment in the sector that produces 
investment goods. (xiii) Within the task-biased (and/or routine-replacing-biased) approach, 
technological progress results also in the introduction of new tasks, thus coupling the 
displacement effect of labor caused by technological progress with a reinstatement effect that 
increases labor demand (see, e.g., Acemoglu and Restrepo 2019; Gregory et al. 2019). 
 
Among deliberate intervention mechanisms, the most important are the following: (i) 
an increase in public expenditure, which increases aggregate demand, production, and hence 
employment and (ii) public subsidies for education and investment in human capital, which 
increase labor productivity and hence make workers competitive with machines. 
 
The idea that compensation theory suffers some drawbacks is certainly true, mainly 
caused by wage and price rigidity, the absence of a further sector beyond the tertiary one to 
which workers can be displaced and public debt, which could prevent massive public 
expenditure.viii That said, until the end of the 20th century, the majority of theoretical 
contributors seemed to agree that compensating forces were effective in counteracting 
technological unemployment, although a number of dissenting opinions did persist.ix  
 
Things changed slightly in recent decades, when the empirical debate focused on the fact 
that, from 1980 onwards, skill-biased technical change reduced unskilled workers’ wages and 
increased skilled workers’ wages (and employment), increasing inequality. Later, the new task 
approachx discussed the impact of technological progress on workers performing different 
tasks, in particular routine and non-routine tasks, rather than on skilled and unskilled workers, 
again with the emphasis on inequality and wage polarization. In any case, at least since the 
contributions of Acemoglu and Restrepo (2107, 2019), the belief that technical progress 
(mainly in the sense of process innovation) does not increase long-term unemployment, 
appeared to be still predominant among economists.  
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The great majority of theoretical models studying the impact of technological progress 
on the economy being strictly rooted in the neoclassical general equilibrium tradition is worth 
noting, with market-clearing equilibria and overlapping generations (see, e.g., Berg et al. 2018; 
Sachs and Kotlikoff 2012; Sachs, Benzell and LaGarda 2015). In most of these approaches, the 
idea that the wage demonstrates a subsistence lower bound is absent, the market clears, and 
hence the problem is not unemployment but the level of wages or the share of wages in income. 
At least until the end of the 20th century, empirical studies seemed to confirm the 
conclusions reached by majority of theoretical analyses. A thorough description of these studies 
can be found in Vivarelli (2014), Gregory et al. (2019), and Calvino and Virgillito (2018).  
 
Most contributions confirmed the results of the theoretical models, (i.e., no long-term 
mass unemployment) for the economic system as a whole in the presence of flexible markets, 
high demand elasticity for both products and factors, and high substitutability between factors 
(see, e.g., Piva and Vivarelli 2017, pp. 11–13). Furthermore, similar results were obtained at 
firm and industry levels. For example, Evangelista and Vezzani (2012) found that at firm level 
in (some selected countries of) the European Union, technological and organizational 
innovation exhibited a positive effect on employment because they increased the growth of 
firms, even though in manufacturing firms the contemporary presence of technological 
innovation and organizational change actually displaced workers. At a sectoral level, Ciriaci et 
al. (2016) showed the positive employment effect of small innovative firms in Spain. Bogliacino 
et al. (2012) found a positive impact of investment made by technological firms on employment 
but not of investment made by manufacturing firms in general, in 677 European companies. 
Coad and Rao (2011) showed that in the United States, high-tech firms’ employment rose with 
innovation, and Van Reenen (1997) showed that in UK manufacturing firms, employment rose 
with innovation too. The conclusions of a study by Lachenmaier and Rottmann (2011) were 
somewhat different; although they confirmed the positive impact of innovation on employment 
in Germany, these authors found that this impact was positive mainly for process innovation. 
Piva and Vivarelli (2005) found a similar effect for the case of Italy, with a positive effect on 
employment of product innovation but no evidence of labor displacement by process 
innovation. Again, Piva and Vivarelli (2018) found that for 11 European countries, R & D 
innovation exhibited a positive impact on employment mainly in the case of product innovation 
in the medium- and high-tech sectors. With reference to imported technological innovations 
through trade and foreign direct investment, Haile et al. (2017) found a positive effect of 
technological progress on employment in Ethiopian firms. Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017, 
2019), within a task-biased technical change model, found an acceleration of the displacement 
effect and hence a reduction of labor demand, especially in manufacturing, in the United States, 
for the period 1987–2017, compared with the period 1947–1987. Finally, Gregory et al. (2019), 
using a routine-replacing technical change approach, found evidence of both displacement and 
reinstatement effects in Europe between 1999 and 2010, but with the reinstatement effect 
prevailing and hence employment increasing. 
 
The majority view also emphasized the circumstance that, consistently with these 
results, the global trend of labor productivity and employment showed co-movement.xi 
Technological shocks could generate waves of short-term unemployment but, in the longer run, 
the trend of employment appeared capable of tracking that of technical progress.  
 
However, with few exceptions, these studies were mainly backward-looking, since they 
were studying the Third rather than the Fourth Industrial Revolution, i.e., they discussed the 
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relation between technical change and employment within both a traditional and a task-
/routine-replacing technical change approach but did not discuss the impact of robots endowed 
with artificial intelligence on employment. They are important for emphasizing what happened 
in the past (particularly, but not exclusively, for skill- and task-biased technical change), but 
almost irrelevant for discussing the Fourth Industrial Revolution. This is also shown by the fact 
that the core of the analysis is represented by the logical concept of task-biased technical 
change, and in particular of routine-replacing technical change, a theoretical construct which is 
relevant in a context in which machines can perform only routine tasks, but which completely 
loses relevance with the advent of artificial intelligence, which allows robots to substitute for 
humans in both routine and non-routine activities (and potentially in all tasks). 
 
The Third Wave of Technological Unemployment and “New Compensation Theory”  
 
In the new century, with the advent of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, different ideas 
began to spread. The book by Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2011) testifies to this change, even 
though today their approach still remains a minority approach among economists. According 
to this new approach, the progressive development of artificial intelligence allows machines to 
substitute for human beings in (almost) all jobs: robots, computers, and computer programs 
demonstrate the potential to replace doctors, truck drivers, accountants, bank clerks, teachers, 
etc.xii Even though the Third and Fourth Industrial Revolutions were based on apparently 
similar technological progress, their impact on wages and/or employment is likely to be rather 
different, since today unemployment can affect skilled and unskilled workers in the same way, 
independently of whether they perform only routine tasks, and long-term mass unemployment 
became a concrete possibility. For the first time, some authors arrived at the point of envisaging 
the theoretical possibility of full unemployment (see, e.g., D’Orlando 2018; or the benchmark 
model in Berg et al. 2018). Up to the present time, this was completely out of the question.  
 
The main drawback of the new approach is the fact that, since the process is only in its 
very preliminary phases, empirical evidence confirming the hypothesis of technological 
unemployment is still poor. However, the contributions of Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017, 
2019) represent a crucial change of perspective; for the first time, they present strong empirical 
evidence that “this time it might be different”, although much more empirical work is certainly 
necessary. In any case, theoretical analysis is perfectly capable of interpreting the new 
phenomenon (see, e.g., Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2011, 2014; Ford 2015; West 2015; D’Orlando 
2018; from a more neoclassical perspective, Acemoglu and Restrepo 2019), even if economists 
appear reluctant to deal with this matter before empirical evidence becomes robust.  
 
The theoretical novelty of the new approach, and the concrete difference with respect to 
the other industrial revolutions, rests upon the role played by robots and artificial intelligence. 
During the former three industrial revolutions, capital, such as machines, cooperated with labor 
in the productive process and could also increase human productivity, meaning that 
unemployment could only rise if demand and production did not rise sufficiently, and 
compensation theory appeared rather effective in preventing the impact of technological 
progress on employment. However, in the Fourth Industrial Revolution, robots endowed with 
artificial intelligence substitute for humans within the productive process, rather than 
cooperating with them (for a clear, albeit rather optimistic, discussion of this point, see, e.g., 
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Acemoglu and Restrepo 2018, p.3). Thus, commodities can be produced by robots alone, 
without any contribution from labor.  
In such a scenario, if robots’ productivity is higher than humans’ productivity and robots’ 
remuneration is lower than workers’ wages in almost all sectors of the economy, firms will hire 
robots and fire humans, thereby increasing human unemployment.  
 
In the “old” scenario, with the rise of unemployment, compensating forces would have 
started operating and, in the long run, would have driven the system back to full employment. 
In this new framework, traditional compensation theory exhibits limited space, since only a few 
of the automatic and deliberate mechanisms might work. In particular, the main elements that 
impact on the validity of traditional compensation theory are substitutability between robots 
and workers and elasticity of demand. According to some authors (see, e.g., Berg et al. 2018; 
Bessen 2018), the demand elasticity reduced over time, so that even if the use of robots in 
productive processes reduces the prices and increases the quality of produced commodities, 
the demand for goods, and hence production and labor demand, does not rise, or shows only 
small increases. In any case, given a certain demand elasticity (and more so if the elasticity is 
low), the greater the substitutability ratio among robots and human workers, the lower the 
strength of compensating forces. If demand elasticity is particularly small, and in any case if the 
substitutability ratio is equal to one, most compensation mechanisms are ruled out.xiii  
 
Indeed, in terms of automatic mechanisms, considering cases of both high 
substitutability and total substitutability, the following points apply: (i) Wage flexibility can 
play a role if, and only if, the wage lower bound is not reached, i.e., if the wage level necessary 
to compensate for humans’ lower productivity is not below the subsistence level. (ii) An 
increase in the demand for robots and the production of robots might cause only a minor 
increase (or no increase at all if the substitutability ratio is equal to one) in human employment 
in the sector that produces robots, if robots can be produced mainly by means of robots (or by 
robots alone). (iii) Reduction in production costs and hence in prices of commodities produced 
by robots increases the demand and the production of these commodities, but this increase 
might cause only a minor increase (or no increase at all if the substitutability ratio is equal to 
one) in employment, if these commodities can be produced mainly by means of robots (or by 
robots alone). (iv) Reduction in production costs and hence in prices of commodities produced 
by robots can cause an increase in the real income and hence the demand and production of 
goods, but this increase might cause only a minor increase (or no increase at all if the 
substitutability ratio is equal to one) in employment, if commodities can be produced mainly 
by means of robots (or by robots alone). (v) Reduction in production costs, in the presence of 
price rigidity, may increase profits and hence investment, but this increase might cause only a 
minor increase (or no increase at all if the substitutability ratio is equal to one) in employment 
in the sector that produces investment goods if investment goods can be produced mainly by 
means of robots (or by robots alone). (vi) Reduction in production costs, in the presence of 
price rigidity, may increase profits, entrepreneurs’ demand for goods and hence production, 
but this increase might cause only a minor increase (or no increase at all if the substitutability 
ratio is equal to one) in employment in the sector that produces consumption goods if 
consumption goods can be produced mainly by means of robots (or by robots alone). (vii) 
Product innovation can create entirely new sectors of activity but might cause only a minor 
increase (or no increase at all if the substitutability ratio is equal to one) in employment in these 
sectors if commodities can be produced mainly by means of robots (or by robots alone) in these 
sectors also. (viii) An increase in the wages of employed humans appears out of the question, 
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but even if this happened, this increase might result in an increase in demand for goods and 
hence production, generating only a minor increase (or no increase at all if the substitutability 
ratio is equal to one) in employment in the sector that produces consumption goods if 
consumption goods can be produced mainly by means of robots (or by robots alone). (ix) At the 
moment, no new sector of relevance beyond the tertiary sector, which is capable of absorbing 
human workers, seems to exist. (x) If robots are humanoid, humans’ marginal productivity does 
not rise more than that of robots with an increase in capital accumulation, meaning that no 
chance exists that human productivity will rise above that of robots. (xi) If robots are humanoid, 
the marginal productivity of labor reduces with that of robots, and the choice of techniques 
does not modify in favor of labor. (xii) A reduction in production costs and hence prices of 
produced commodities increases the real supply of money, reduces the interest rate, and in 
turn increases the production of investment goods, but if investment goods are also produced 
by robots alone, employment might not rise or might rise in only a minor way. (xiii) With the 
introduction of artificial intelligence, the number of new tasks that can be performed only by 
humans in the production process will fall, so that the displacement effect will be dominant 
over the reinstatement effect - this is also the main empirical conclusion of Acemoglu and 
Restrepo (2019). 
 
Concerning traditional deliberate intervention mechanisms: (i) an increase in public 
expenditure might demonstrate only a minor impact (or no impact at all if the substitutability 
ratio is equal to one) on employment, if an increase in the demand and production of goods 
generates only an increase in the demand for goods produced mainly by means of robots (or by 
robots alone) and (ii) public subsidies for education and investments in human capital might 
likely be unable to increase human productivity above that of robots (incidentally, the skill 
premium ceases to demonstrate a role, and both skilled and unskilled workers are affected in 
the same way by technological unemployment). 
 
Compensating forces might therefore be ineffective in the Fourth Industrial Revolution, 
so that the final result of long-term mass unemployment is not only a possible but also a rather 
likely scenario. 
 
The peculiarity of the Fourth Industrial Revolution is worth emphasizing again, which 
jeopardizes compensation theory and cannot be studied by using the assumption that capital 
cooperates with humans in the productive process. Models must explicitly assume that robots 
endowed with artificial intelligence can substitute for human workers, both skilled and 
unskilled, performing both routine and non-routine tasks (so that routine-replacing technical 
change is a completely useless concept for discussing this topic). To put this another way, 
studying the Fourth Industrial Revolution requires a completely different framework and not 
simply the old approach used to study the Third Industrial Revolution (or the first two). 
Furthermore, empirical data are again of little utility, and of no utility at all if they refer to what 
happened more than a decade ago, since the Fourth Industrial Revolution and the introduction 
of artificial intelligence into production processes is a phenomenon that began in this decade 
and will impact on empirical data only in future decades.  
 
However, although in the presence of the third wave of technological unemployment 
market forces alone might be ineffective in returning the system to full employment, some 
deliberate intervention mechanisms can (and indeed should) be implemented.  
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In the literature, we can find a number of intervention policies, the most important of 
which are as follows. 
i. Subsidize the hiring of humans by paying employment subsidies to firms that 
hire humans.  
ii. Tax the hiring of robots.xiv  
iii. Allow workers to accept wages below the subsistence level by paying an 
unconditional basic income to all citizens, both employed and unemployed. Once 
the subsistence basket is obtained, workers can decide whether or not to accept 
a low wage competitive with robots’ remuneration for being hired and increase 
their consumption above subsistence, or to stay voluntarily unemployed and 
receive only the subsistence income.xv  
iv. Boost education and/or professional training, cutting the costs of private 
investment in human capital, or directly offering this education and/or training 
for free to humans, to increase human productivity and make workers 
competitive with robots.xvi  
v. Impose minimum human employment quotas, or maximum robot employment 
quotas on firms.xvii  
vi. Nationalize firms, assign the ownership of robots (or firms) to citizens or 
encourage workers to buy shares in firms.xviii 
vii. Accept long-term mass unemployment and subsidize all humans with an 
unconditional basic income or subsidize only the unemployed with huge 
unemployment allowances.xix 
 
The most debated and well known among these possible policies is the payment of an 
unconditional (or universal) basic income to all citizens, irrespective of whether they are 
employed or unemployed. The unconditional basic income is “a cash grant provided to every 
citizen […] without any other eligibility requirement” (Tanner 2015, p. 3), with different specific 
goals, from fighting poverty and inequality to counteracting technological unemployment. In 
this latter case, the basic income must be high enough to ensure subsistence, as the assumption 
exists in what follows.  
 
Few studies in the economic literature on the consequences of the payment of an 
unconditional basic income exist (see, e.g., Van der Linden 1997, 2002; Bowles 1992; Gamel et 
al. 2006; Pech 2010; Marchant et al. 2014; Tanner 2015).xx Among the positive aspects of the 
payment of an unconditional basic income, some scholars emphasize the circumstance that a 
basic income “would be simpler and more transparent than the current welfare bureaucracy… 
would reduce paternalism and government involvement in the lives of poor people… would 
more effectively alleviate poverty… could provide better incentives – or at least fewer 
disincentives – for work” (Tanner 2015, p. 7; see also Widerquist 2017). Other scholars reach 
the opposite conclusion that the basic income “fails to provide an incentive to find work or 
engage in other meaningful and beneficial activities […], provides an automatic government 
handout to individuals while reducing their esteem in their own eyes and those of their 
neighbors and contacts [and] would be very expensive” (Marchant and Stevens 2017, p. 1). 
Studies based on income and substitution effects were developed, but they are quite 
inconclusive concerning the impact of a basic income on labor supply, the wage equilibrium 
and work effort (see, e.g., Martinelli 2017, p. 51 ff). However, the idea that the basic income 
reduces labor supply and work effort, inducing people to remain idle, is quite widespread. 
Leaving traditional for less traditional economic approaches, we again find different opinions. 
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Some scholars refer to behavioral economics and evolutionary game theory to conclude that 
when altruistic behavior and behaviors based on habits or heuristics substitute for self-interest 
and maximizing behavior, “individuals may not shirk when given income guarantees” 
(Widerquist, Lewis, Pressman 2005, p. 590). However, insights from the debate on the role of 
intrinsic motivations suggest that when subsistence is ensured, motivating people to work 
(and/or to exert high work effort) might be difficult, or at least might be difficult for certain 
kinds of jobs if the incentive is merely monetary (or extrinsic). Furthermore, “for those tasks in 
which a person demonstrates a high intrinsic motivation to perform, the introduction of an 
extrinsic incentive (in the form of a monetary reward or a fine) undermines her intrinsic 
motivation, which may cause her to decrease the level of effort” (Pech 2010, p. 8). Thus, 
according to most contributions, the possibility exists that the basic income reduces the 
incentive to work, work effort, and economic efficiency, even if different opinions exist. 
 
The basic income may also present some relevant problems related to well-being. On 
this aspect, the main conclusion reached by D’Orlando (2019) is that the payment of an 
unconditional basic income will, in many cases, reduce well-being with respect to alternative 
policies. In particular, hedonic adaptation and loss aversion can be used to show that the 
payment of a basic income cannot adequately compensate people for the psychological costs of 
unemployment, which all empirical studies consider as one of the worst experiences in life. 
Furthermore, unemployed earners of the basic income will be unable to generate envy in other 
people, whereas they will envy the employed and robot/firm owners. They will suffer problems 
of self-esteem and social stigma. Finally, they will be unable to escalate to higher-grade 
consumption behaviors (as well as being aware of this inability) and to realize their aspirations, 
which are also circumstances that reduce well-being. The payment of a higher basic income 
might compensate for the first problem, the psychological costs, but not for others. On the 
contrary, employed earners of the basic income will enjoy a significant increase in well-being 
due to the possibility of both generating envy over the unemployed and escalating to higher-
grade consumption behaviors. As a result, well-being inequality will increase. 
 
Therefore, possible alternative solutions to the basic income should be considered. 
Among these solutions, the most promising appear to be a reduction in per capita working 
hours and the possible implementation of a “cap-and-trade” solution, which mimics that of 
Tietenberg’s (1990, 2003) traditional tradable-permits approach to environmental problems, 
imposing quotas of workers to be hired by firms, but with the opportunity to trade these quotas. 
These two solutions also incur some drawbacks, but, according to D’Orlando (2019), combining 
both with the payment of a basic income, which rises over time, could guarantee efficiency, 
almost full employment, and acceptable results in terms of well-being. 
 
 Political Economy or Economics?  
 
The world emerging from the third wave of technological unemployment will be 
radically different from the world that neoclassical theory more or less successfully dealt with 
from 1870 onward. Since the new scenario appears similar in many aspects to the pre-1870 
scenario, which saw the predominance of a completely different economic theory, questions 
may arise regarding whether the traditional neoclassical approach is the best theoretical tool 
for systematizing this new reality, or whether a return to older theories might be appropriate.  
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In the history of economic thought, we saw an important theoretical evolution when the 
class conflict between landlords and capitalists ended with the victory of the latter. The 
traditional classical approach, rooted in the works of Smith, Ricardo, and (somehow) Marx, 
progressively lost relevance, whereas the neoclassical approach rooted in the works of Walras, 
Jevons, Marshall, and Clark, progressively acquired relevance. Indeed, with the success of 
capitalists in the class conflict against landlords, and the fear that a new class struggle could 
arise between capitalists and proletarians, a less conflictive theory for describing economic 
reality became more consistent with the interests of the new ruling class. The neoclassical 
approach met this latter requirement perfectly. This circumstance can therefore (at least 
partially) contribute to explaining its success. 
 
The crucial differences existing between classical and neoclassical theory were not 
immediately perceived (or emphasized) by economists. Indeed, the conventional view 
considered classical authors as mere precursors of neoclassical authors. However, after the 
publication of Sraffa’s book Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities (Sraffa 1960), 
the idea that the two theories were radically different in a number of relevant aspects became 
clear.xxi On the basis of these differences, and in consideration of the different role that classical 
economists gave to political and social factors, classical theory is often referred to as “Political 
Economy”, whereas neoclassical Economics is often referred to simply as “Economics”.xxii 
 
Classical Political Economy demonstrates a number of key distinguishing features with 
respect to Economics. Here, we shall only focus on the most relevant of them (and/or on those 
that appear more useful for discussing the implications of technological unemployment). These 
key characteristics are as follows. 
 
1. Classical Political Economy studies social institutions and their relations with the 
decisions of production and consumption and with the distribution of income 
among the different social classes.  
2. The social classes of capitalists, landlords, and workers are considered to be at 
the center of economic dynamics and hence are at the center of economic 
theoretical investigation.  
3. Workers possess only their capacity to work, and the real wage they earn is given 
at the subsistence level. Forces exist that are capable of driving the wage back to 
a subsistence level if by accident it departs from that level.xxiii The circumstance 
that wages are in general lower than the value of workers’ contribution to 
production can be used to provide a theoretical basis for exploitation (although 
the foundations of exploitation represent a rather controversial topic in classical 
theory).xxiv 
4. Capitalists possess capital. Their productive share, i.e., the surplus they obtain, is 
residual: it is what remains of the value of production once wages (to workers) 
and rents (to landlords) were paid.xxv  
5. It follows that the class struggle among capitalists and the other classes to modify 
the distribution of the surplus is not just possible, but somehow inevitable.xxvi  
6. The value of produced commodities is rooted in the cost of production, and in 
general, this value is considered to be linked with the labor content of the 
commodity, although the labor theory of value represents the most critical 
drawback and the most debated topic in classical and classical-type theories.xxvii 
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7. The theory studies long-period positions, i.e., fully adjusted equilibria 
characterized by the realization of long-period equilibrium prices in all sectors of 
the economy, with cleared markets and the same rate of profits in all sectors.xxviii 
8. Although many classical economists believed that in a freely competitive market, 
forces existed capable of driving the system towards optimal equilibrium and full 
employment, others, (i.e., Malthus and Marx) came to different conclusions.xxix 
In contrast, the key characteristics of neoclassical Economics are as follows. 
 
1. According to the famous definition by Lionel Robbins, Economics is “the science 
which studies human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means, 
which exhibit alternative uses” (Robbins 1935, p. 16). As a consequence, 
neoclassical authors believe that the main goal of theoretical investigation is to 
describe the optimal behavior of single (fully rational) individuals who aim at 
maximizing their objective functions.xxx 
2. The concept of social classes is useless for understanding economic reality. Fully 
rational maximizing individuals are considered to be at the center of economic 
dynamics and hence at the center of economic theoretical investigation.xxxi 
Maximizing individuals possess different quantities of the three factors of 
production (land, labor, and capital). 
3. The wage is the remuneration for the service of one of the three factors of 
production, i.e., labor, and is determined by the same criteria governing the 
remuneration for the services of the other factors, i.e., on the basis of marginal 
productivity. In particular, the real wage is determined in the market by labor 
demand and labor supply. This corresponds to the marginal product of labor. 
Since the marginal product of labor corresponds also to workers’ productive 
contribution, the wage also corresponds to workers’ productive contribution and 
exploitation cannot exist. 
4. The same is true for capital (and for any other factor). The remuneration for the 
service of capital corresponds to the marginal product of capital. Since the 
marginal product of capital corresponds to the productive contribution of capital, 
the factor receives a remuneration which corresponds to its productive 
contribution.xxxii  
5. From the points above, they show that class struggle between capitalists and 
other classes is impossible; not only social classes do not exist, but each factor 
earns a remuneration equal to its contribution to the productive process, so that 
income distribution is inevitably fair.xxxiii 
6. In a neoclassical approach, the value of the produced commodity is meaningless; 
the price of the good is the key variable, and this is determined in the market by 
demand and supply. Demand and supply ultimately depend upon utility (this also 
explains why we consider commodities in classical theory and we consider goods, 
i.e., objects that generate utility, in Economics).  
7. Although the first models maintained the reference to long-period equilibria and 
equal rates of profits, the theory soon focused on short-period equilibria.xxxiv  
8. Price signals and price flexibility in a free competitive market drive the economic 
system towards optimal equilibrium and full employment.xxxv Public intervention 
is considered inappropriate, since the market is itself capable of reaching the 
optimal allocation of resources. 
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The neoclassical approach dominated theoretical analysis from 1870 up to the present, 
and in the last century, this approach further extended its boundaries. In particular, Nobel 
laureate Gary Becker, during the second half of the 20th century, “extended the domain of 
microeconomic analysis to a wide range of human behaviors and interactions, including non-
market behavior.”xxxvi Put another way, nowadays neoclassical Economics is considered 
capable of dealing with any decision problem, from the optimal intertemporal allocation of time 
between criminal activities to the choice of a partner.  
 
Possible reasons for the past loss of relevance of Political Economy and the success of 
neoclassical Economics may be found in the evolution of concrete economic problems and/or 
in the different kinds of theoretical reality that the new ruling class wanted to represent. Now 
that economic reality is likely to radically change again, a new evolution in the theoretical 
framework seems possible. If with the Fourth Industrial Revolution economic reality evolves in 
the way we sketched in the preceding sections, Political Economy will be more suitable than 
neoclassical Economics for furnishing hints for interpreting such a different reality.  
 
This is so, since neoclassical Economics was constructed for dealing with the problem of 
scarcity, not of distribution. According to Autor (2015, p. 28), “[i]f machines were in fact to 
make human labor superfluous, we would have vast aggregate wealth but a serious challenge 
in determining who owns it and how to share it”. Indeed, neoclassical Economics was not 
constructed for dealing with a reality in which class struggle between a few robot owners and 
many unemployed humans exists, labor productivity demonstrates no theoretical relevance 
and is uncorrelated with the subsistence wage/subsidy received by workers, redistributive 
policies gain relevance with respect to the optimal allocation of scarce means, and so on. These 
characteristics may return economic theorization to the years of classical Political Economy, 
with the focus on social classes, class struggle, and the redistribution of surplus. These are 
precisely the themes that will be in the spotlight in the near future, when the problem will be 
extracting surplus from robots and redistributing the surplus to the unemployed, in order to 
guarantee subsistence for humans and a demand for commodities produced by robots. 
 
In particular, neoclassical Economics faces significant difficulties when trying to 
systematize the four main implications of the third wave of technological unemployment: 
subsistence wages, class struggle, the determination of profits, and a long-term unemployment 
equilibrium (and the consequent inevitability of public policies). Political Economy appears 
better equipped for dealing with these topics. 
 
The first difficulty concerns the determination of the equilibrium wage and the 
equilibrium level of employment. We saw in the preceding sections that in the presence of the 
third wave of technological unemployment, leaving the determination of wages and 
employment to market forces is not possible, otherwise equilibrium wages might fall below 
subsistence, and long-term mass unemployment would result. In such a context, public policies 
act to guarantee humans at least subsistence, either by subsidizing firms who hire human 
workers or by guaranteeing an unconditional basic income to all citizens. In the presence of 
policies other than subsidies and a basic income (for example when mandatory quotas of 
workers to be hired are imposed on firms), the wage does not determine the number of workers 
hired by a firm. As a result, the theoretical mechanism which, according to neoclassical 
Economics, rules wages and employment determination is no longer consistent with actual 
wages and employment determination in the scenario of the third wave of technological 
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unemployment: the concepts of marginal productivity, supply and demand for (the service of) 
labor, the disutility of labor, etc., no longer demonstrate any role. On the contrary, the classical 
notion of a subsistence wage and the idea that forces capable of driving the wage towards 
subsistence exist appear to be consistent with the economic dynamics realized within this new 
scenario. However, classical authors gave greater importance to automatic mechanisms 
capable of driving wages towards subsistence (albeit with differences between one author and 
another), whereas in the technological unemployment framework, greater relevance is to be 
attributed to public policies. In any case, the wage level becomes independent of economic 
forces and depends upon public policies and hence, ultimately, upon the relative contractual 
power of social classes. 
 
Indeed, the central role played by the contractual power of social classes, and hence by 
the class struggle, is the key characteristic of the scenario depicted above, since the third wave 
of technological unemployment will ultimately divide society into the two conflicting classes of 
unemployed humans and robot owners. The resulting class struggle appears to be difficult for 
economic theory in general to deal with, and in particular, almost impossible for neoclassical 
Economics to deal with. This is so also due to a political circularity. The rise of technological 
unemployment calls for redistributive policies. However, many of these policies, for example 
the introduction of an unconditional basic income or collectivizing firms, allow humans not to 
work and hence reduce their contractual power, while others hide but do not suppress the fact 
that workers are (at least almost) useless for production. With low contractual power, humans 
will not demonstrate enough political strength to defend the basic income or the redistributive 
policies they succeeded in obtaining when they exhibited residual contractual power. Thus, 
mass poverty would be a possible outcome. Proposing fair solutions is (relatively) simple, but 
implementing them requires a political and social strength that humans only possessed, if they 
possessed this strength at all, when they were irreplaceable workers, and will not possess when 
they are replaceable and replaced by robots. In any case, class struggle becomes a key 
characteristic of the new era, together with the need for a contamination of economic theory by 
politics. As we saw above, neoclassical Economics, in contrast to Political Economy, was not 
built for dealing with social classes and their conflicts. 
 
Class struggle exhibits a crucial role also in the determination of profits, since the 
relative contractual power of humans and robot owners, mediated by government policies and 
not by market forces, determines distributive shares. In particular, firms’ profits will (also) 
depend upon government subsidies, wages paid to humans, and taxes paid to the government, 
all elements determined by political rather than economic forces. Again, in this case, classical 
Political Economy appears better equipped than neoclassical Economics to deal with questions 
regarding the distribution of surplus.  
 
Finally, within the scenario of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, maximizing subjects, 
price signals and freely competitive markets will not drive the system towards full employment 
but towards long-term mass unemployment. Therefore, the free market outcome would be a 
market failure. Hence, market forces cannot be left free to operate alone, and public 
intervention will be necessary. Now, neoclassical Economics accepting public intervention in 
the presence of market failures is certainly true. However, the superiority of free markets over 
regulated economies represents one of the key philosophical foundations, rather than just a 
simple theoretical implication, of the traditional approach. Even though the works of some 
classical economists, for example Smith, did in fact act as precursors for neoclassical ideas on 
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the optimality of free markets, Political Economy is still superior to neoclassical Economics in 
dealing with this problem. Furthermore, neoclassical Economics is not at all equipped for 
dealing with one of the possible solutions to technological unemployment, namely, assigning 
the ownership of firms to the collective. This would be considered the worst possible solution. 
 
Neoclassical models that till today are used to discuss the consequences of the Fourth 
Industrial Revolution are often rooted in a general equilibrium framework, with a labor market 
that should clear like all other markets, ad hoc hypotheses in production functions, sometimes 
with the use of the representative agent and overlapping generations hypotheses. These models 
can deal with equilibrium unemployment only with enormous difficulty, and they face even 
greater difficulties in dealing with long-term technological unemployment, which challenges 
this approach also with the problems depicted above. Political Economy faces fewer structural 
problems in building models aiming at studying technological unemployment. 
 
Obviously enough, Political Economy must be purged by the labor theory of value, which 
is highly inconsistent with a framework within which production can be realized without 
human contribution. However, after Sraffa’s (1960) book, the labor theory of value has no 
longer been present in the contemporary classical-type approach. 
The starting point for treating technological unemployment in a classical-type way may 
indeed be Sraffa’s Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities model. Considering the 
case in which robots do not exist, Sraffa’s system of equations, or a slightly modified version of 
Sraffa’s system of equations, can be written as follows: 
(1)  𝒑𝒑∗ = 𝜜𝜜𝒑𝒑∗(1 + 𝑟𝑟) + 𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍 𝒑𝒑∗, 
where A is the square matrix of technical coefficients, l is a column vector representing labor 
input per unit of output, r is the rate of profits (which is equal across sectors), 𝒑𝒑∗ is a column 
vector representing the relative prices of output commodities, and x is a row vector 
representing the quantities of commodities contributing to the real wage. The unknowns are 
the prices 𝒑𝒑∗ and the rate of profits r; the technical coefficients and the labor input vector are 
considered as known. The classical economists considered also the real wage vector as given, 
but nothing prevents the assumption that the rate of profits instead is given.  
 
 The system (1) can be solved in a well-known way (see, e.g., D’Orlando 1997, pp. 52–55).  
 What changes when robots enter the scene? For the sake of simplicity (and since 
classical economists studied only fully adjusted long-period equilibrium positions), let us 
assume that the substitutability between humans and robots is complete in any task and that 
the wage/productivity ratio of robots is lower than that of humans, so that humans are all 
unemployed and only robots produce all the commodities. In this elementary extreme model, 
we can also assume that robots are humanoid machines and capitalists who own robots rent 
them out to entrepreneurs, who organize the production and earn the profits. In these 
circumstances, nothing changes with reference to the system of equations (1), but now we 
substitute 𝒍𝒍𝑹𝑹 for l, where 𝒍𝒍𝑹𝑹 is a column vector representing robot input per unit of output 
rather than labor input, so that 𝒍𝒍𝑹𝑹 𝒍𝒍𝑹𝑹 𝒑𝒑𝑹𝑹∗  is the robot owners’ revenue, and the technical 
coefficients of production become 𝑨𝑨𝑹𝑹 (≠ 𝑨𝑨). In addition, the equilibrium prices change (𝒑𝒑𝑹𝑹∗ ≠
𝒑𝒑∗), as well as the rate of profits (𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅 ≠ 𝑟𝑟). The resulting system of equations can hence be 
written as: xxxvii 
(2)  𝒑𝒑𝑹𝑹∗ = 𝜜𝜜𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑𝑹𝑹∗ (1 + 𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅) + 𝒍𝒍𝑹𝑹𝒍𝒍𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑𝑹𝑹∗  
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lR Due to the presence of mass technological unemployment, government is likely to 
implement intervention policies, for example imposing mandatory quotas on firms for hiring 
humans. The system of equations is therefore modified as follows: 
(3)  𝒑𝒑𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹∗ = 𝑨𝑨𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹∗ (1 + 𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅) + 𝒍𝒍𝑹𝑹𝒍𝒍𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹∗ + 𝒍𝒍𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝒍𝒍𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹∗  
Firms are forced to hire a certain number of workers, and the remaining production is 
realized by robots. Now, 𝒍𝒍𝑹𝑹 is a column vector representing labor input per unit of output, 𝒍𝒍𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹 is 
a column vector representing robot input per unit of output, 𝒍𝒍𝑹𝑹 𝒍𝒍𝑹𝑹 𝒑𝒑𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹∗  is workers’ revenue, and 
𝒍𝒍𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝒍𝒍𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹∗  is robot owners’ revenue. It is worth noting that by acting in this way, the 
government induces firms to modify also the technical coefficients of production, the 
equilibrium prices, the rate of profits, and robot owners’ revenue (𝑨𝑨𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹 ≠ 𝑨𝑨𝑹𝑹 ≠ 𝑨𝑨, 𝒑𝒑∗𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹 ≠ 𝒑𝒑𝑹𝑹
∗ ≠
𝒑𝒑∗, 𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 ≠ 𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅 ≠ 𝑟𝑟 and 𝒍𝒍𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝒍𝒍𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹∗ ≠ 𝒍𝒍𝑹𝑹𝒍𝒍𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑𝑹𝑹∗ ). 
 
Furthermore, in the system of equations (3), by considering the row vector of produced 
quantities 𝒒𝒒� and labor force as givens, determining human employment 𝒒𝒒� 𝒍𝒍𝑹𝑹 , robots 
employment 𝒒𝒒� 𝒍𝒍𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹 , and unemployment is possible.  
 
The above model is only a first, elementary example of the way in which a classical-type 
approach can deal with the theme. Similar models can easily be developed, in order to discuss 
other public intervention policies and their consequences, testifying that the economic reality 
emerging from the third wave of technological unemployment is capable of revitalizing Political 
Economy, which appears better equipped than neoclassical Economics for theoretically 
systematizing the peculiar problems that emerge when distributive questions are on the scene 
but scarcity is not. Substituting Political Economy for Economics does not substitute for the 
huge amount of theoretical work that economists must do in order to deal with the quickly 
approaching problem of long-term technological unemployment, but such a solution 
constitutes a key preliminary step, without which the near future will be much more obscure. 
4. Conclusions  
As discussed above, the third wave of technological unemployment exhibits 
characteristics and implications radically different from the first and the second waves. While 
the first two waves reduced human employment in specific sectors (agriculture at first, 
manufacturing later on) or reduced wages and/or employment for unskilled workers and/or 
workers performing routine tasks, leading to rising inequality, the third wave will eventually 
be capable of destroying (almost) all jobs for humans (both skilled and unskilled, both routine 
and non-routine) in all sectors of the economy. This is due to the fact that, while the first two 
waves of technological unemployment were caused by the development of more productive 
machines, the third wave resulted from the introduction of robots into the production process. 
Unlike machines, robots do not cooperate with workers, but they substitute for them in the 
production process. As a result, traditional compensating forces, which in the past proved to be 
capable of preventing the impact of technical progress on employment, will be ineffective. Due 
to the relatively high productivity and low cost of robots, a wage reduction should be significant 
enough to compensate for technological unemployment and to guarantee human employment, 
but the existence of a lower bound for the wage corresponding to the subsistence level may 
easily prevent such a huge wage reduction to happen. In addition, an increase in demand could 
result in an increase in the production of commodities produced by robots alone, and hence in 
employment for robots alone. Therefore, long-term mass unemployment is not only a possible 
but a rather likely scenario, calling for redistributive policies. 
 American Review of Political Economy June 28, 2020 
 
 
Vol. 15, No. 1. https://doi.org/10.38024/arpe.of.6.28.20 18 
 
Among the solutions that were proposed, taxing robots, subsiding the hiring of humans, 
collectivizing the ownership of firms, implementing a basic income, and imposing quotas for 
human (or robot) employment appear to be the most popular suggestions. All these solutions 
present drawbacks and generate untenable class conflicts, and therefore much more theoretical 
study is necessary to identify the less dangerous ones. 
 
However, theoretical study on the topic is problematic if the tools used are those rooted 
in neoclassical Economics, and in particular in its general equilibrium version, currently the 
dominant approach, which appears to be incapable of dealing with a reality characterized by 
the renewed importance of social classes, a class struggle between a few robot owners and 
many unemployed humans, subsistence wages, or basic income uncorrelated with labor 
productivity, an important renewal of the relevance of redistributive policies, public ownership 
of the means of production, and so on. The old approach, rooted in the work of the classical 
economists, i.e., Political Economy, appears to be better equipped than neoclassical Economics 
for dealing with these themes.  
 
Envisaging a renewal of the relevance of the old classical Political Economy is therefore 
possible, or at least a renewal of the relevance of a theoretical approach very similar to classical 
Political Economy, without the labor theory of value, as a consequence of the third wave of 
technological unemployment. Sraffa’s approach could be a robust starting point for such a 
purpose. 
 
As a final consideration, the idea that the absence of significant empirical evidence 
should not be considered as an obstacle to the study of a possible future scenario of long-term 
mass unemployment emanating from the last wave of technological progress is worth 
emphasizing. In general, empirical evidence precedes theoretical studies; in this case, it would 
be better to exhibit a thorough theoretical analysis and possibly full consciousness of the policy 
tools that could be implemented, long before long-term mass unemployment becomes an 
empirical reality. However, consciousness of the need for developing a theoretical study of the 
problem also before robust empirical evidence manifests will not succeed in generating 
theoretical models capable of systematizing the new reality (and dealing with the crucial 
problem of long-term mass unemployment) if a crucial preliminary step is ignored. This 
preliminary step is the acknowledgment of the limited ability of the traditional neoclassical 
approach to deal with the new reality emerging from the third wave of technological 
unemployment and the consequent choice to use some hints from, and the theoretical structure 





 American Review of Political Economy June 28, 2020 
 
 
Vol. 15, No. 1. https://doi.org/10.38024/arpe.of.6.28.20 19 
REFERENCES 
 
Abbott, R. and Bogenschneider, B. 2017. “Should Robots Pay Taxes? Tax Policy in the Age of 
Automation”, Harvard Law & Policy Review, 12, pp. 145-175, 2018. Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2932483 or  
 http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2932483  
Acemoglu, D. and Autor, D. 2011. “Skills, Tasks and Technologies: Implications for Employment 
and Earnings”, Handbook of Labor Economics, Edited by D. Card and O. Ashenfelter, Vol. 
4, Part B, pp. 1043-1171, North Holland, San Diego, CA, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0169-
7218(11)02410-5  
Acemoglu, D. and Restrepo, P. 2016. “The Race Between Machines and Humans: Implications 
for Growth, Factors Shares and Jobs”, https://voxeu.org/article/job-race-machines-
versus-humans 
Acemoglu, D. and Restrepo, P. 2017, “Robots and Jobs: Evidence from US Labor Market”, NBER 
Working Paper No. 23285, https://www.nber.org/papers/w23285, DOI: 
10.3386/w23285 
Acemoglu, D. and Restrepo, P. 2018. “The Wrong Kind of AI? Artificial Intelligence and the 
Future of Labor Demand”, TNIT News, December, Toulouse School of Economics, 
https://idei.fr/sites/default/files/IDEI/documents/tnit/newsletter/newsletter_tnit_2
019.pdf  
Acemoglu, D. and Restrepo, P. 2019. “Automation and New Tasks: How Technology Displaces 
and Reinstates Labor”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 33(2), pp. 3-30  
Autor, D., Levy, F. and Murnane, R. J. 2003. “The Skill Content of Recent Technological Change: 
An Empirical Exploration”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118 (4), pp. 1279-1333 
Autor, D., Katz L. and Kearney, M. 2006. “The Polarization of U.S. Labor Market”, American 
Economic Review, 96 (2), pp. 189-194 
Autor, D., Katz, L. and Kearney, M. 2008. “Trends in U.S. Wage Inequality: Revising the 
Revisionists”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 90 (2), pp. 300-323 
Autor, D. H. 2013. “The ‘Task Approach’ to Labor Markets: An Overview”, National Bureau of 
Economic Research Working Paper No. 18711 
Autor, D. H. and Handel, M. 2013. “Putting Tasks to the Test: Human Capital, Job Tasks, and 
Wages”, Journal of Labor Economics, 31(2), pp. 59-96 
Autor, D. H. 2015. “Why are there still so many jobs? The history and future of workplace 
automation”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 29 (3), pp. 3-30 
Baumol W. and Oates, W. 1971. “The Use of Standards and Price for Protection of the 
Environment”, Journal of Economics, 73(1), pp. 42-54 
Berg, A., Buffie, E. and Zanna, L. 2018. “Should we Fear the Robot Revolution? (The Correct 
Answer is Yes)”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 97(C), pp. 117-148 
Bessen, J. 2018. AI and Jobs: The Role of Demand, NBER Working Paper 24235 
Blien, U. and Ludewig, O. 2017. “Technological Progress and (Un)employment Development, 
IZA Discussion Paper No. 10472”, http://ftp.iza.org/dp10472.pdf  
Bogliacino, F. and Pianta, M. 2010. “Innovation and employment. A reinvestigation using 
revised Pavitt classes”, Research Policy, 39 (6), pp. 799-809  
Bogliacino, F., Piva, M. and Vivarelli, M. 2012. “R&D and employment: An application of the 
LSDVC estimator using European data”, Economics Letters, 116 (1), pp. 383-404  
Bowles, S. 1992. “Is Income Security Possible in a Capitalist Economy?: An Agency Theoretic 
Analysis of an Unconditional Income Grant“, European Journal of Political Economy, 8(4), 
pp. 557-578 
 American Review of Political Economy June 28, 2020 
 
 
Vol. 15, No. 1. https://doi.org/10.38024/arpe.of.6.28.20 20 
Brynjolfsson, E. and McAfee, A. 2011. Race Against the Machine. Digital Frontier Press, 
Lexington, MA 
Brynjolfsson, E. and McAfee, A. 2014. The Second Machine Age. W. W. Norton & Company, New 
York, NY and London 
Calvino, F. and Virgillito, M. E. 2018. “The Innovation-Employment nexus: a Critical Survey of 
Theory and Empirics”, Journal of Economic Surveys, 32(1), pp. 83-117 
Campa, R. 2014. “Technological Growth and Unemployment: A Global Scenario Analysis”, 
Journal of Evolution and Technology, 24 (1), pp. 86-103 
Campa, R. 2017. “Technological Unemployment. A Brief History of an Idea”, ISA eSymposium 
for Sociology, 1-16, 
http://www.academia.edu/31689849/Technological_Unemployment._A_Brief_History
_of_an_Idea 
Card, D. and Di Nardo, J. 2002. “Skill-biased Technical Change and Rising Wage Inequality: Some 
Problems and Puzzles”, Journal of Labor Economics, 20 (4), pp. 733-783 
Ciriaci, D., Moncada-Paternò-Castello, P. and Voigt, P. 2016. “Innovation and job creation: a 
sustainable relation?”, Eurasian Business Review, 6 (2), pp. 189-213  
Clark, J. B. 1891. “Distribution as determined by a Law of Rent”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
5 (3), pp. 289-318, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/1879611  
Coad, A. and Rao, R. 2011. “The firm-level employment effects of innovations in high-tech US 
manufacturing industries”, Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 21 (2), pp. 255-283  
D’Orlando, F. 2005. “Will the Classical-Type Approach Survive Sraffian Economics?”, Journal of 
Post Keynesian Economics, 27(4), pp. 633-654 
D’Orlando, F. 2018. “Problems, solutions and new problems with the third wave of 
technological unemployment,” Working Papers 2018-02, Universita' di Cassino, 
Dipartimento di Economia e Giurisprudenza 
D’Orlando, F. 2019. “Social Interaction, Envy, and the Basic Income: Do Remedies to 
Technological Unemployment Reduce Well-being?”, paper presented at the 16th STOREP 
Annual Conference in Siena (June 2019) 
Dustmann, C., Ludsteck, J. and Schönberg, U. 2009. “Revisiting the German Wage Structure”, The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124 (2), pp. 843-881 
Evangelista, R. and Vezzani, A. 2012. “The impact of technological and organizational 
innovations on employment in European firms”, Industrial and Corporate Change, 21 (4), 
pp. 871-899  
Feldmann, H. 2013. “Technological Unemployment in Industrial Countries”, Journal of 
Evolutionary Economics, 23 (5), pp. 1099-1126 
Ford, M. 2015. Rise of the Robots. Technology and the Threat of a Jobless Future, Basic Books, 
New York, NY 
Ford, M. 2009. The Lights in the Tunnel. Automation, Accelerating Technology and the Economy 
of the Future, Acculant Publishing, https://ieet.org/archive/LIGHTSTUNNEL.PDF  
Ford, M. 2015. Rise of the Robots. Technology and the Threat of a Jobless Future, Basic Books, 
New York, NY 
Freeman, C. and Soete, L. 1994. Work for All or Mass Unemployment? Computerised Technical 
Change into the Twenty-first Century, Pinter, London-New York  
Freeman, R. 2015. “Who Owns the Robots Rules the World”, IZA World of Labor, 
https://wol.iza.org/articles/who-owns-the-robots-rules-the-world/long 
Frey, C. B. and Osborne, M. A. 2017. “The future of employment: how susceptible are jobs to 
computerisation?”, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 114 (C), pp. 254-280  
 American Review of Political Economy June 28, 2020 
 
 
Vol. 15, No. 1. https://doi.org/10.38024/arpe.of.6.28.20 21 
Friedman, M. 1962. Capitalism and Freedom, University of Chicago Press, London and Chicago, 
IL  
Gamel, C., Balsan, D., Vero, J. 2006. “The Impact of Basic Income on the Propensity to Work: 
Theoretical Issues and Micro-econometric Results”, Journal of Socio-Economics, 35(3), 
pp. 476-497 
Garegnani, P. 1976. “On a Change in the Notion of Equilibrium in Recent Work on Value and 
Distribution: A Comment on Samuelson”, in M. Brown, K. Sato and P. Zarembka (eds), 
Essays in Modern Capital Theory. Amsterdam, North Holland, pp. 25-43 
Graetz, G. and Michaels, G. 2015. “Robots at Work”, CEP Discussion Paper No. 1335  
Gregory, T., Salomons, A. and Zierahn, U. 2019. Racing with or against Machine? Evidence from 
Europe, IZA Working Paper 12063 
Haile, G., Srour, I. and Vivarelli, M. 2017. “Imported Technology and Manufacturing Employment 
in Ethiopia”, Eurasian Business Review, 7 (1), pp. 1-23  
Hayek, F. 1987. Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. 3: The Political Order of a Free People. University 
of Chicago Press, London and Chicago, IL 
Hughes, J. 2014. “Are Technological Unemployment and a Basic Income Guarantee Inevitable 
or Desirable?”, Journal of Evolution and Technology, 24 (1), pp. 1-4 
Hunt, E. K. and Lautzenheiser, M. 2011. History of Economic Thought. A critical Perspective. M.E. 
Shape, Armonk, New York and London 
Katsoulacos, Y. S. 1984. “Product innovation and employment”, European Economic Review, 26 
(1-2), pp. 83-108  
Keynes, J. M. 1930. “Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren” in Keynes, J. M., Essays in 
Persuasion, http://www.econ.yale.edu/smith/econ116a/keynes1.pdf  
King, J. E. 1983. “Utopian or Scientific? A Reconsideration of the Ricardian Socialist”, History of 
Political Economy, 15(3), pp. 345-373 
Kurz, H. and Salvadori, N. 2014. Classical Economics after Sraffa, Paper given at the conference 
“What have we learnt on Classical economics since Sraffa?”, Université Paris Ouest, 
Nanterre, October 16th-17th, 2014 
Lachenmaier, S. and Rottmann, H., 2011. “Effects of innovation on employment: A dynamic 
panel analysis”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 29 (2), pp. 210-220  
Malthus, T. 1798. An Essay on the Principle of Population, Electronic Scholarly Publishing 
Project, http://www.esp.org, 1998 
Marchant, G., Stevens, Y. and Hennessy, M. 2014. “Technology, Unemployment and Policy 
Options: Navigating the Transition to a Better World”, Journal of Evolution and 
Technology, 24(1), pp. 26-44 
Marchant, G. and Stevens, Y. 2017. “Policy Solutions to Technological Unemployment”, in K. 
Lagrandeur and J. Hughes (eds), Surviving the Machine Age: Intelligent Technology and 
the Transformation of Human Work. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, pp. 117-130  
Marx, K. 1887. Capital. A Critique of Political Economy, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1965 
Martinelli, L. 2017. “Assessing the Case for a Universal Basic Income in the UK”, IPR Policy Brief, 
Institute for Policy Research, University of Bath, Bath, 
https://researchportal.bath.ac.uk/en/publications/ipr-policy-brief-assessing-the-
case-for-a-universal-basic-income-  
Miller, B. and Atkinson, R. 2013. “Are Robots Taking Our Jobs, or Making Them?”, The 
Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, September, 
http://www2.itif.org/2013-are-robots-taking-jobs.pdf 
Neisser, H. 1942. “‘Permanent’ Technological Unemployment. Demand for Commodities Is Not 
Demand for Labour”, American Economic Review, 32 (1), pp. 50-71 
 American Review of Political Economy June 28, 2020 
 
 
Vol. 15, No. 1. https://doi.org/10.38024/arpe.of.6.28.20 22 
Paine, T. 1797 (2000). Agrarian Justice, reprinted in H. Steiner and P. Vallentyne (eds), The 
Origins of Left-Libertarianism. An Anthology of Historical Writings. Palgrave, Basingstoke, 
pp. 83-97  
Pech, W. 2010. “Behavioral Economics and The Basic Income Guarantee”, Basic Income Studies, 
5(2), pp. 1-17  
Peters, M. 2017. “Technological Unemployment: Educating for the Fourth Industrial 
Revolution”, Educational Philosophy and Theory, 49 (1), pp. 1-6, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2016.1177412  
Pianta, M. 2005. “Innovation and employment”, in J. Fagerberg, D. Mowery and R. R. Nelson 
(eds), Handbook of Innovation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 568-598 
Piva, M. and Vivarelli, M., 2005. “Innovation and employment: Evidence from Italian microdata”, 
Journal of Economics, 86 (1), pp. 65-83 
Piva, M. and Vivarelli, M. 2017. “Technological Change and Employment: Were Ricardo and 
Marx Right?”, IZA Discussion Paper 10471.  
Piva, M. and Vivarelli, M. 2018. “Technological Change and Employment: Is Europe Ready for 
the Challenge?”, Eurasian Business Review, 8 (1), pp. 13-32  
Polanyi, K. 1944. The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origin of Our Time, 
Beacon Press, Boston, MA  
Ricardo, D. 1821. On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, Batoche Books, Kitchener 
(Canada), 2001 
Robbins, L. 1935. An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science. MacMillan and 
Co., London  
Sachs, J. and Kotlikoff, L. 2012. “Smart machines and long-term misery”, Techn. Report 18629, 
National Bureau of Economic Research 
Sachs, J., Benzell, S. and LaGarda, G. 2015. “Robots: Curse or blessing? A basic framework”, 
Techn. Report 21091, National Bureau of Economic Research 
Schwab, K. 2016. The Fourth Industrial Revolution, World Economic Forum, New York, NY 
Skidelsky, R. 2015. “Minimum Wage or Living Income”, Project Syndicate, July 16th. 
Smith, A. 1937 (1776). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, The 
Modern Library, New York 
Sraffa, P. 1960. Production of commodities by means of commodities. Prelude to a critique of 
economic theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
Tanner, M. 2015. “The Pros and Cons of a Guaranteed National Income”, Policy Analysis, CATO 
Institute, No. 773, May 12th, pp. 1-35, https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/ 
pubs/pdf/pa773.pdf  
Tietenberg, T. 1990. “Economic Instruments for Environmental regulation”, Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, 67(1), pp. 17-33 
Tietenberg, T. 2003. “The Tradable-Permits Approach to Protecting the Commons: Lessons for 
Climate Change”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 19(3), pp. 400-419 
Tobin, J. 1966. “The Case for an Income Guarantee”, The Public Interest, 4, pp. 31-41 
The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, 1992. Press Release, October 13th, 
https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-
sciences/laureates/1992/press.html 
Van der Linden, B. 1997. “Basic Income and Unemployment in a Unionized Economy”, 
Discussion Paper (Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 1997014, Université 
Catholique de Louvain, Louvain 
Van der Linden, B. 2002. “Is Basic Income a Cure for Unemployment in Unionized, Economies? 
A General Equilibrium Analysis”, Annales d’Économie et de Statistique, 66, pp. 81-105 
 American Review of Political Economy June 28, 2020 
 
 
Vol. 15, No. 1. https://doi.org/10.38024/arpe.of.6.28.20 23 
Van Parijs, P. 2004. “Basic Income: A Simple and Powerful Idea for the Twenty-first Century”, 
Politics & Society, 32(1), pp. 7-39  
Van Reenen, J. 1997. “Employment and technological innovation: evidence from UK 
manufacturing firms”, Journal of Labor Economics, 15 (2), pp. 255-284 
Violante, G. 2008. “Skill-biased Technical Change”, paper prepared for the New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics,  
 http://www.econ.nyu.edu/user/violante/Books/sbtc_january16.pdf  
Vivarelli, M. 1995. The Economics of Technology and Employment: Theory and Empirical 
Evidence, Edward Elgar Publishing, Aldershot  
Vivarelli, M. 2007. “Innovation and Employment: A Survey”, IZA Discussion Paper No. 2621, 
http://ftp.iza.org/dp2621.pdf  
Vivarelli, M. 2014. “Innovation, Employment and Skills in Advanced and Developing Countries: 
A Survey of Economic Literature”, Journal of Economic Issues, 48(1), pp. 123-154 
Walras, L. 1954. Elements of Pure Economics, or the Theory of Social Wealth, Routledge, 
London and New York  
West, D. 2015. What Happens if Robots Take the Jobs? The Impact of Emerging Technologies on 
Employment and Public Policy, Center for Technology Innovation at Brookings, 
Washington, DC, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/robotwork.pdf  
Widerquist, K., Lewis, M., Pressman, S. 2005. “The basic income guarantee and social 
economics”, in Review of Social Economy, LXIII (4), pp. 587-593 
Widerquist, K. 2017. “Basic Income’s Third Wave”, in Open Democracy, 18 October 2017, 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/beyond-trafficking-and-slavery/basic-income-s-third-
wave/ 
Wolff, R. and Resnick, S. 2012. Contending Economic Theories: Neoclassical, Keynesian and 
Marxian, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA and London 
Zheng, Y., Guerriero, M., Lopez, E. and Haverman, P. 2017. “Universal Basic Income: A Working 






* Dipartimento di Economia e Giurisprudenza, Università di Cassino e del Lazio Meridionale; 
fabio.dorlando@unicas.it. A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the 15th STOREP Annual 
Conference in Genova (June 2018). The author thanks all those who participated in that presentation and, in 
particular, Robert Leonard. The author also thanks Paolo Ramazzotti, Marina Bianchi and three anonymous 
referees (who commented on different versions of this paper) for their helpful comments. The usual caveats apply. 
 
i For a synthetic but rather complete description of the classical and neoclassical contributions concerning the 
impact of technological progress on unemployment, see Vivarelli (1995, 2007), Feldmann (2013), Abbott and 
Bogenschneider (2017), and Campa (2017). From the perspective of the history of economic thought, the concept 
of technological unemployment gained momentum in orthodox economic theory after Ricardo’s contributions and 
lost relevance when Wicksell relaunched the neoclassical approach to compensation theory, while theoretical 
interest was reignited by Keynes’ 1930 short essay (Campa 2017, p. 7). 
ii “ ‘Skill-Biased Technical Change’ (SBTC thereafter) is a shift in the production technology that favors skilled (e.g., 
more educated, more able, more experienced) labor by increasing its relative productivity and, therefore, its 
relative demand. Ceteris paribus, SBTC induces a rise in the skill premium – the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages” 
(Violante 2008, p. 2). 
 
 American Review of Political Economy June 28, 2020 
 
 
Vol. 15, No. 1. https://doi.org/10.38024/arpe.of.6.28.20 24 
 
iii The conclusion according to which, in recent decades, technological progress increased the polarization of wage 
income, negatively affecting unskilled workers, was widespread albeit rather controversial. On this point, see Card 
and Di Nardo (2002), Autor et al. (2003, 2006, 2008, 2013), Violante (2008), Dustmann et al. (2009), Acemoglu 
and Autor (2011), Freeman (2015) and Acemoglu and Restrepo (2016). 
iv On task-based (and routine-replacing) technical change, see, e.g., Vivarelli (2014), Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017, 
2019) and Gregory et al. (2019). 
v “Indeed, in the first half of the XIX century, economists put forward a theory that Marx later called the 
‘compensation theory’ (…) This theory is made up of different market compensation mechanisms which are 
triggered by technological change itself and which can counterbalance the initial labor-saving impact of process 
innovation” (Vivarelli 2007, p. 2).  
vi According to Campa (2017, p. 10), “[t]o put it briefly, while marginalist economists keep denying the problem of 
technological unemployment, Keynesians are sure that the problem exists, but they are also confident that it can 
be solved with opportune public policies”. 
vii The traditional argument, first discussed by Neisser (1942), is that the impact of technical progress on 
employment depends upon demand elasticity: “if product demand increases enough there is no unemployment 
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